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Lecture topics
￿ Cryptology
￿ Encryption
￿ Secure hash
Security and cryptology
￿ Information security = crypto?
￿ A signicant art by itself
) not something average M.Sc (Eng) must master
￿ Cryptography only a part of solution
￿ One need to know
{ which cryptographic methods to select
{ how to use those (and how not to use)
￿ Signicant development in last 30, 10 years
What we like to do?
1. Conceal information
2. Verify information integrity
3. Make sure that we have access to information
￿ The rst two are (somewhat) served with cryptology
￿ For the third one cryptography may help | and may harm
{ because of how many security protocols are designed, DoS with cryptographic methods
can be easy: for example in initial handshake the server may need to do complex
calculations to determine that the other party is not authorised.
Terminology
Plaintext M is information we want to protect
Ciphertext C is protected form of M
Enciphering transforms plaintext to ciphertext
Deciphering transforms ciphertext to plaintext
Key K is used to decipher ciphertext
Public key Kp anyone can have access to
1Secret key Ks only owner may have access to
Initialisation Vector IV is known parameter
Message digest H = h(M), xed length value
Attacks to defeat cryptography
ciphertext only is known, and one tries to nd the corresponding plaintext (and the key)
known plaintext and corresponding ciphertext is known: one tries to nd the key
chosen plaintext attack: attacker can feed plaintexts of one's choice to the system and
learn corresponding ciphertexts
Kerckhos' six design principles
1. The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable;
2. It must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy
without inconvenience;
3. Its key must be communicable and retainable without the help of written notes, and change-
able or modiable at the will of the correspondents;
4. It must be applicable to telegraphic correspondence;
5. It must be portable, and its usage and function must not require the concourse of several
people;
6. Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command its application, that the
system be easy to use, requiring neither mental strain nor the knowledge of a long series of
rules to observe.
The more secrets the system has, the more brittle it is. A key is the easiest component to change.
This principle is also known as Shannon's Maxim [3].
Design principles
￿ Confusion
{ complex relationship between K and C
{ e.g. substitution
￿ Diusion
{ no statistical relationship between M and C
{ one-bit change in M results change in every bit in C with P = 1
2
{ avalanche eect
{ e.g. transposition
Ciphers
￿ Substitution cipher
{ plaintext M enciphers always to C with key K
{ Caesar cipher: C = (M + K) mod 26, K = 3
{ modern block ciphers (block size 64 bits(8 bytes: 1:8  1019 dierent blocks) or more)
￿ One-time pad
{ unbreakable cipher (Vernam cipher)
{ if K used only once
{ K as long as M
2{ stream ciphers emulate
￿ Message digests
{ take arbitrary long M producing xed-length digest D
Block ciphers
￿ Few basic types
{ SP-networks (substitution-permutation networks)
{ Feistel ciphers
￿ data halved, halves mixed with round function
￿ Operation modes
electronic code book (ECB) used as substitution cipher
{ same M encrypts to the same C with same K
{ vulnerable to cut-and-splice
cipher block chaining (CBC) uses previous ciphertext Ci 1  Mi
{ initialisation vector IV1
) randomises rst block IV  M1
{ still possible to defeat integrity
output feedback (OFB) used as stream cipher K1 = fIVgk, Ki = fKi 1gk
counter encryption Ki = fIV + igk
{ possible to parallelise for high-speed processing
cipher feedback C is encrypted with K and XOR with plaintext
{ recovers from transmission errors
message authentication code (MAC) to verify integrity
{ CBC mode, all but latest block discarded: keyed hash function
Data Encryption Standard (DES)
￿ Feistel cipher
￿ Developed by IBM in 1970s, modied by NSA, federal standard (FIPS-46) 1976
￿ Key length 56 bits
) too short nowadays
{ 1998 EFF \Deep Crack" (cost USD250,000) broke DES challenge in 56 hours with
brute force
￿ Four weak and 16 semi-weak keys
￿ Still usable as Triple DES (3DES)
{ C = DESK3(DES
 1
K2(DESK1(M)))
{ ecient key length 112 bits, while some advertise 168 bit key The second step could be
also DES encryption, but on some hardware-based systems decrypting gives a better
performance.
1Can be embedded into message
3Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
￿ SP-network
￿ Subset of Rijndael (xed block length 128 bits)
￿ Ecient also on small systems (smartcards etc.)
{ AES-128 about as fast as DES2
) 3 times faster than Triple DES
￿ Key length 128, 196 or 256, the shortest not for Top Secret in US
￿ FIPS-197
Stream ciphers
￿ Cryptographic secure pseudo-random number generator
￿ XOR by bit or by byte (synchronous stream cipher)
￿ Popular in communications
{ byte-sized: no need to pad blocks
{ simple implementation on hardware: for example A5/1 needs only three shift registers
(19, 22, and 23 bits) and some XOR ports
￿ Vulnerable to bit-ddling: if one knows that an interesting bit at position N should be
inverted, one can just change it from the bit stream. On the other hand this provides some
protection from transmission errors: with block ciphers one will end with a large block of
invalid data.
￿ RC4 used in SSL, WEP
￿ A5/1 and A5/2 in GSM
￿ Both have security problems, A5/2 very weak
Asymmetric ciphers
￿ Symmetric ciphers provides secrecy only if one can communicate the key to other party
secretly
) key management becomes problem
￿ Use a problem that is
{ easy to construct
{ hard solve without
{ specic knowledge (= private key)
￿ NP-complete problems are good candidates. However, not every NP-complete problem is
suitable for asymmetric cipher. For example, knapsack problems were thought to be good
algorithms, but they have been broken.
￿ Can be used to provide a digital signature without third party
2On modern 32-bit computer.
4RSA
3
￿ Factoring large numbers is hard
￿ Public key:
{ n = pq, p and q large primes
{ e relatively prime for (p   1)(q   1)
￿ Private key:
{ d = e 1 mod ((p   1)(q   1))
￿ Encrypting: c = me mod n
￿ Decrypting: m = cd mod n
ElGamal
￿ Discrete logarithm in a nite eld
￿ y = gx mod p, prime p, random numbers g < p, x < p
￿ Public key: y, g, and p
￿ Private key: x
￿ Signature: random k (relatively prime for p   1, must be kept secret)
{ a = gk mod p, solve b from M = (xa + kb) mod (p   1)
{ verify: yaabmod = gM mod p
￿ Encrypting: a = gk mod p, b = ykM mod p
￿ Decrypting: M = b=ax mod p
Message digest functions
￿ Calculating a signature for a long document
{ time-consuming
{ as large (or larger) than the original document
￿ Verifying document integrity
{ signed digest
{ digest stored or communicated securely. For example, there can be a list of hashes of
all system les on read-only media. If any of those is modied, it may be detected by
comparing hashes.
￿ Cryptographic checksum function
1. H = h(M) easy to compute
2. infeasible to nd M for given H
3. infeasible to nd M, M0 such that h(M) = h(M0)
4. an one-bit change in M should result every bit in H to change with P = 1
2
￿ Birthday attack: 2
n
2
3Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman
5Secure hash algorithms in use
MD5 designed in 1991
￿ 128-bit
￿ some weakness found, maybe insecure for demanding applications
SHA-1 federal standard 180-2
￿ 160-bit
￿ original SHA (1993, SHA-0) vulnerable to 239
￿ SHA-1 vulnerable to a collision at 263
￿ longer versions (SHA-2) to 512 bits; not analysed in depth
RIPEMD-160 European algorithm
￿ 160-bit, also longer ones
HMAC: keyed hash
￿ Used for authentication with shared secret[2]
￿ h(K  opadjjh(K  ipadjjM))
{ ipad and opad select dierent bits4 from K
￿ Protects K from eavesdropping
What cipher to choice
￿ How to distribute keys
￿ What trust model one has
￿ Any performance constrains
￿ Using public algorithms gives comfort, as if there is a weakness, it will be publicly known
with good probability.
￿ Beware snake oil: unbreakable, certied, technobabble, secret, military grade, ...[1]
Failures on ciphers
￿ Even if you take a good algorithm, wrong use may result bad security
￿ A bad algorithm is always bad security
￿ Do not modify a cryptographic algorithm: adding rounds or increasing the key length may
result in a weaker algorithm.
￿ Check that you use cryptographic as planned
{ stream ciphers: use dierent IV each time
{ MS Oce uses same IV for all saves of same document
4ipad=0x36..., opad=0x5c. ..
6WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy
￿ Use of encryption optional
) system administration failures
￿ No key management: use of shared key
￿ CRC-32 used for integrity check
{ linear algorithm: possible to x changes with stream cipher bit-ddling
￿ IV only 24 bit
{ wraps around in a day (or faster)
{ shared key )same IV by multiple hosts
￿ Attacks
{ statistical analysis for packets with the same IV
{ injecting known trac e.g. from the Internet enables decrypting packets with the same
IV
{ if the RC4 stream for one packet is known, it is possible to send encrypted packets
with the same IV
{ bit-ddling attacks to change the content or the destination of packets
{ bad software key generators: key space may be 221, not 264
{ dictionary attack on keys, like for passwords. You can make attack passively just by
capturing a number of packets and trying dierent passphrases to nd out the key.
Key lengths: how long is safe
￿ How long time the information must stay secret
￿ Longer key results in more computational load: limits available communication speed or
increases power consumption on mobile devices.
￿ Symmetric ciphers
{ risk: a fundamental weakness will be found or advances in computing
{ 64 bit cipher broken: RSA RC5 challenge
{ 128 bits should be OK
{ 196{256 bit AES key for Top Secret
￿ Asymmetric ciphers
{ risk: advances in mathematics or in computing
{ 576-bit key factored
{ RSA key lengths and same-level symmetric keys
prime bits symmetric
1024 80
2048 112
3072 128
15360 256
{ elliptic curves: double to symmetric keys
￿ Message digests
{ SHA-1 currently used, retried by 2010
{ SHA-2 algorithms unsure
7Some performance gures for 1 KiB blocks
Algorithm relative speed
DES CBC 1000
RC4 3638
AES 128 921
AES 196 796
AES 256 705
RSA 1024 sign 7 / 1000
RSA 1024 verify 132 / 1000
RSA 4096 sign 0.2 / 1000
RSA 4096 verify 12 / 1000
MD5 4992
SHA-1 3360
Summary
￿ Bits do not matter (much)
￿ Important
{ to select the right algorithm for the right use
{ to use algorithm in the right way
￿ Hardware used may impose some limitations
￿ For many uses, the performance is not a real problem
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